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1. I would like to thank Ángela Marcos Figueruelo for her valuable comments. All remaining 
errors are mine.
A scorpion and a frog meet on the bank of a stream and the scorpion ask the frog to 
carry him over a river. The frog asks, «How do I know you won’t sting me?» and the 
scorpion replies, «Because if I do, I will die too». The frog agrees carrying the scorpion, 
but midway across the river the scorpion stings the frog that feels the onset of paralysis 
and starts to sink. Knowing that both are doomed the frog asks, «Why?» the scorpion 
replies, «it’s my nature» (popular fable). 
Many believe that the European Court of Justice (hereinafter, the Court) in Case 
C-131/12 acted like the scorpion in the popular animal fable, not being able to evade its 
nature as judicial ward and thus falling into the short-sighted trap of the immediate pro-
tection of the interest of the complainant. To outline the result of the above-mentioned 
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case, the Court endorsed the previous view adopted by the Spanish Data Protec-
tion Agency (AEPD) in requiring Google Spain and Google inc. to take the necessary 
measures to withdraw the data relating to a Spanish citizen, Mr Costeja González, 
from their index and to render access to the data impossible in the future. The pages 
indexed in the search engine list of results contained an announcement published in 
La Vanguardia’s newspaper of 1998 for a real estate auction organised following the 
proceedings for the recovery of social security debts owed by Mr Costeja González.
This conclusion, that basically allows individuals to request that public information 
about them be delated from search engine listings has undergone, as pointed-above, 
heavy criticism mostly by digital rights advocates. These reproaches, which at first sight 
might seem inexplicable coming from organizations which support freedoms in the di-
gital world, are more understandable if one believes that the following two basic ideas 
hold true: first, that there is an insuperable conflict between freedom of expression and 
information and high levels of protection of personal data; and, second, that the conflict 
of interest between internet users and data subjects cannot be satisfactorily balanced 
on a case-by-case basis. These ideas inform the opinion of Advocate General (AG) 
Jääskinen who not only indicated the more or less obvious existence of the conflict 
between freedom of information and the high levels of protection of personal data that 
would be necessary to support in order to endorse the conclusion of the AEPD, but 
also the naivety of the case-by-case approach. These same ideas are rejected by the 
Court. According to the Court conflict might be reconcilable and thus the controller 
(broadly speaking the person who determines the purpose of the processing of perso-
nal data) needs to reasonable assess the circumstances of the particular case to arrive 
to a reasonable decision. Too much reason and reasonability, perhaps, for a search 
engine, that is a business, that would need to make a great economic and operational 
effort to manage an otherwise unmanageable number of request of citizens that want 
to «be forgotten» or that would avoid this financial and operational burden by the auto-
matic withdrawal of links to any objected contents. 
AG Jääskinen also refers to the importance of reason, but by contrast to the Court, 
his reasonableness is used to justify a perspective that transcends the particular interests 
of Mr Costeja González to embrace also the objectives of the digital age and the legiti-
mate interests of the internet users. In other words, reason or the exercise of reason is 
not deferred to the controller, as it happens in the Court’s assessment, but is by contrast 
used to justify the a priori exclusion of the need for the controller’s to determine whether 
the right to be forgotten applies to a concrete situation. AG Jääskinen does this by first, 
denying that a search engine who acts as intermediary between users and published 
content can be rightly defined as controller and second, by denying the existence of a 
right of the data subject to address a search engine in order to prevent indexing of the in-
formation relating to him personally, published legally on third parties’ web sites, invoking 
his wish that such information should not be known to the internet users.
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In the below lines I claim that while agreeing with AG Jääskinen overall approach, 
I believe his first conclusion, that I call «the first conclusion from reason», is wrong. I 
also argue that his second conclusion, «the second conclusion from reason» is right. In 
addition I believe that the Court is right in recognizing search engine service providers 
as controllers, and wrong in granting a right to be forgotten when accurate and legal 
content is involved. 
THE FIRST ASSESSMENT FROM REASON: ON WHETHER A 
SEARCH ENGINE CAN BE DEFINED AS CONTROLLER
In the opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, the absence of immediate human 
intermediation in the data processing operation should play a relevant role in the deter-
mination of what (or who) is the «controller». According to Directive 95/46/EC on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data (hereinafter the Directive or the Data Protection Directive), the 
controller is «the natural or legal person, public authority, agency which alone or jointly 
with others determines the purpose and means of the processing of personal data» 
(see Article 2(d) the Directive). AG Jääskinen expresses that search engine providers 
like Google do not possess the means of changing the information of the source web 
pages that their mechanized crawler function has retrieved and copied, and thus these 
search engines cannot be aware of the existence of personal data in any other sense 
than as a statistical fact. Obviously a search engine can always re-establish its basic 
search parameters to exclude displaying certain source web pages, but the a priori es-
tablishment of a precautionary filtering policy cannot be equated with the fundamental 
component of awareness. Indeed for AG Jääskinen, the proposition «determination of 
the purpose and means of the processing of personal data» should be understood as 
constant, frictionless and humanly mediated determination. He offers the example of 
the e-Commerce Directive 2000/31, in which the exceptions to liability of Articles 12, 
13 and 14 are built on the legal principle according to which automated, technical and 
passive relationships to electronically stored or transmitted content do not create con-
trol or liability over it. In addition, the EU legislator in the Data Protection Directive also 
seems to embrace the idea of the exclusion of responsibility for passive relationships. 
In this respect recital (47) of the Directive affirms that in messages containing personal 
data transmitted by means of telecommunication or electronic mail services, the con-
troller will normally be considered to be the person from whom the message originates. 
Even the Opinion 1/2008 of the Working Party on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of Personal Data (also known as Article 29 Working Party 
because the legal basis for its creation is found in Article 29 of the Directive) states that 
«the principle of proportionality requires that to the extent that a search engine provider 
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acts purely as an intermediary, it should not be considered as the principal controller 
with regard to the content related processing of personal data that is taking place». 
Therefore, according to AG Jääskinen, a «truthful construction of the Directive», and 
more concretely of Article 2(d) must take into account the complexities associated with 
the information society in general, and of search engines in particular. Indeed, these 
complexities seem to have been understood by the EU legislator in the e-Commerce 
Directive and by the Article 29 Working Party. 
The Court in its judgment of 13 May 2014 expresses a different opinion. For the 
Court the search engine operator clearly determines the purposes and means of data 
processing operations and accordingly it should be qualified as controller. The Court 
disregards the passivity or unawareness element emphasized by AG Jääskinen in his 
opinion and justifies its interpretation of Article 2(d) of the Directive on textual grounds 
and on the impact that search engines have in the dissemination of personal data. In this 
respect the Court states that «inasmuch as the activity of a search engine is therefore 
liable to affect significantly […] the fundamental rights to privacy and to the protection of 
personal data, the operator of the search engine as the persona determining the purpo-
ses and means of that activity must ensure, within the framework of its responsibilities, 
powers and capabilities, that the activity meets the requirements of Directive 95/46» (see 
paragraph 38). Therefore, the Court takes a simplified view of processing operations, one 
in which the realities about the processing of data are outweighed by the impact of these 
processing operations on the data subjects. Indeed, if for AG Jääskinen the ontology of 
the information society justifies the narrow interpretation of the concept of controller, for 
the Court is by contrast the impact of data processing operations on the data subjects’ 
rights the element justifying the broad understanding of Article 2(d).
Reason, understood in this context as what it should be thought as reasonable for 
the interpreter of Article 2(d) taking into account the impact of its interpretation in data 
subjects, internet users and economic operators such as search engine service provi-
ders, calls for an interpretation of the concept of controller along the lines followed by 
the Court. Indeed, the narrow understanding of controller proposed by AG Jääskinen 
has the consequence of leaving search engines practically outside of the scope of the 
Data Protection Directive. Even if one is against preventing indexing of accurate and 
legal personal data-related information, it would not be prudentially wise for a Court to 
cancel their future review power over the data processing operations of search engi-
nes. In addition, the argument from ontology put forward by AG Jääskinen, even if ac-
curate from the point of view of the operational activity of search engines, cannot avoid 
the fact that search engines must assume certain responsibility from the huge impact 
that they have in their automatic dissemination of data. 
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THE SECOND ASSESSMENT FROM REASON:  
ON WHETHER A RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN EXISTS  
WHEN ACCURATE AND LEGAL CONTENT IS INVOLVED
With «the right to be forgotten» commentators refer to both the right of erasure and 
blocking of data and the right to object to the processing of information containing per-
sonal data. These rights are respectively provided for in Article 12(b) and Article 14(a) of 
the Directive. According to Article 14(b) a data subject shall possess the right to obtain 
from the controller the rectification, erasure or blocking of the data which does not 
comply with the Directive, in particular because of the incomplete or inaccurate charac-
ter of the data. Analogously Article 14(a) provides, obviously upon transposition, for the 
right to object «on legitimate grounds» to the data processing operation. Since the right 
to be forgotten can only by invoked vis-a-vis the controller, the relevancy of this right in 
Case C-131/12 passes for the recognition of the search engine as a controller. In that 
case, and as far as the right to be forgotten is not considered in absolute terms, the 
service provider would need to leave its passive and intermediary position between the 
internet user and the publisher, and adopt the role of the latter in order to verify whether 
the dissemination of the personal data of the website can be considered as legal and 
legitimate for the purposes of the Directive. In other terms, the recognition of the search 
engine as controller places the latter in a position that does not correspond with its 
traditional operative functioning and moreover, it compels it to make an assessment 
on an issue that until that moment was foreign to its interests. This is however, and as 
it has been indicated above, a burden and a responsibility that the search engine must 
assume. 
According to AG Jääskinen, even if the search engine is recognized as a controller, 
the relative or non-absolute character of the right to be forgotten makes it inapplicable 
in the present circumstances. Indeed, Article 6 of the Directive indicates the need for 
the controller to ensure that the data is processed fairly and lawfully, collected for spe-
cified and legitimate purposes, proportional in relation to its purposes, accurate and, 
where necessary, kept up to date. It is therefore clear from the wording of this Article 
that the controller must weigh its interests against those of the data subject. These 
interests might be rightly invoked in the form of fundamental rights, and accordingly the 
case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) might also be of relevance. 
In this respect AG Jääskinen does not deny that the right to be forgotten might be ade-
quately derived from the right to private life of Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. He refers to the view of the ECHR in the Aleksey Ovchinnikov case in which it 
stated that «in certain circumstances a restriction on reproducing information that has 
already entered the public domain may be justified, for example to prevent further airing 
of the details of an individual’s private life which do not come within the scope of any 
political or public debate on a matter of general importance». However AG Jääskinen 
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also points to other rights at stake, such as the freedom to conduct a business or 
the freedom of information, recognized respectively in Article 16 and Article 11 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. In relation to the former, AG Jääskinen considers that 
commercial internet search engine service providers such as Google offer their infor-
mation location services in the context of business activity aiming at revenue from 
keyword advertising. In relation to the latter, he refers to case Times Newspapers Ltd v. 
the United Kingdom in which the ECHR observed that internet archives «constitute an 
important source for education and historical research, particularly as they are readily 
accessible to the public and are generally free […] the margin of appreciation afforded 
to States in striking the balance between the competing rights is likely to be greater 
where news archives of past events, rather than news reporting of current affairs are 
concerned». The right of information is precisely relevant in the context of the reference 
at hand because in the contemporary information society, one of the most important 
ways of materialising this right is by means of search engines. Accordingly, AG Jääski-
nen believes that in addition to the interests of the controller and the data subject, the 
interest of the internet users to exercise their right of information should also be taken 
into account. Indeed, in the present litigation the exercise by internet users of their right 
of receiving information is undisputed since as AG Jääskinen claims, the data protec-
tion problem would only be present if an internet user types the data subject’s name 
and surnames into the search engine’s search bar. The internet subject appears then 
as an active agent who purposively uses his right to receive information concerning the 
data subject from public sources for reasons known only to him. 
It is precisely that presence of the internet user exercising his right to receive infor-
mation that shifts the balance towards the not recognition of a right to be forgotten to 
the data subject in the present circumstances. Indeed, and as AG Jääskinen expres-
sed in his preliminary observations, the correct, reasonable and proportionate balance 
between the constellation of fundamental rights and interests present in the case at 
hand should also take into account the coherent interpretation of the objectives of the 
information society and legitimate interests of the economic operators and internet 
users at large. Therefore, once this broad view is adopted, is easy to conclude that 
it would not make sense enlarge the scope of protection of the data subject under 
the Directive at the expense of the fundamental rights of freedom of information and 
expression. AG Jääskinen’s view is also forward-looking since he believes that conclu-
ding in favour of (i) the recognition of search engines as controllers, (ii) the recognition 
that in conformity to Article 12(b) the data subject might in case of lawful information 
published in websites address the search engine in order withdraw the links containing 
that information, and (iii) the recognition of an effective right to be forgotten even in ca-
ses in which other rights such as the right of freedom of information and expression are 
involved, would lead to the automatic withdrawal by search engines of the links to any 
objected content, assuming a lower organisational costs that otherwise would need to 
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assume in case they set a internal mechanism in order to deal with complaints by the 
data subjects. 
The Court in interpreting Articles 12(b) and 14(a) of the Directive cannot any longer 
rely in a textual approach. Indeed, a prima facie textual interpretation of Article 12(b) 
would not justify the removal of the links to websites displayed in the list of results 
offered by the search engine since that provision refers in particular to data of an in-
complete or inaccurate nature. The Court, in order to extend the right to be forgotten 
to situations of lawful published content, as it does in the present case, must justify this 
extension on the basis of certain claims or in theory about the purpose of the Directive. 
It is precisely with this aim that the Court points to recital 10 to refer to the high level of 
protection that it must offer to natural persons under the Directive, in particular to their 
right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data. The Court claims that 
the right to privacy must necessarily be interpreted in the light of fundamental rights, 
however and by contrast to the opinion of AG Jääskinen, the Court does not elaborate 
an extended argument justifying the greater weight of the right to privacy over other 
competing rights such as the freedom to conduct a business or the freedom of informa-
tion and expression. The only argument in this respect is found in paragraphs 80 and 
81 of the judgment wherein the Court highlights the possibility for an internet user to 
obtain a detailed profile of the data subject through a simply search by the individual’s 
name. According to the Court, the potential seriousness of this interference to the data 
subject’s right to privacy cannot be justified on the economic interest that the search 
engine may have in the processing. In relation to the interest of the internet users, the 
Court argues that as a general rule, the latter is overridden by the data subject’s right 
to privacy, but that however the balance may depend, in specific cases, on the nature 
of the information in question and its sensitivity for the data subject’s private life and on 
the interest for the public of having that information, an interest that may vary according 
to the role played by the data subject in public life. What the Court does not address is 
whether freedom of information or expression might override the data subject’s right to 
privacy in situations in which the information on the latter is not incomplete or inaccu-
rate and has been lawfully published. Indeed the vagueness of the Court’s reasoning in 
relation to the relative weights of the involved rights and interests paves the way to its 
argument in favour of addressing these conflicting interests on a case-by-case basis. 
Since, according to the Court, the principles relating to data quality of Article 6 and the 
criteria for making data protection legitimate of Article 7, belong to the considerations 
that might be invoked by the data subject in order to obtain his right to be forgotten, 
and furthermore, since these considerations have all a general character, the controller 
would need to take all these circumstances into account when dealing with potential 
complaints on the basis of Article 14 of the Directive.
That case-by-case method outlined by the Court, even if reasonable as far as it 
shows a concert for the particularities and complexities that might be involved in an 
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individual case, seems to forget how things work in reality. Agents will normally drive 
their behaviour by minimizing costs. In this respect, and as AG Jääskinen has rightly 
indicated, a search engine will not set up costly conflict-solving mechanisms to deter-
mine whether in a concrete case the right to be forgotten applies. A search engine will 
normally anticipate possible conflicts by automatically withdrawing objected contents; 
a measure that negative affects the right of information and free expression. In addition, 
the search engine might start (and indeed has already started) to place generic search 
warnings when it believes someone is searching for an individual name, whether or not 
the content related to the name has been removed, making those warnings completely 
useless for providing any clear indication of removed content, and affecting thus in an 
even more negative way the right of information.
Therefore since these pragmatic concerns are intrinsically linked with fundamental 
rights-based considerations, it would be more reasonable if the Court followed the opi-
nion of AG Jääskinen and denied the existence of a right to be forgotten when accurate 
and legal content is involved. 
CONCLUSION
This commentary started with the popular fable of the scorpion and the frog, and 
despite to what it has been said above it would not be totally fair to identify the Court 
with the scorpion since the Court surely regarded its decision as the correct one (the 
same cannot be said of the scorpion). However and only a few months after the adop-
tion of the decision, the concerns on the freedom of information and expression raised 
by AG Jääskinen seem to have materialized (the reader can try by himself: for example, 
the introduction of the name «omar jones» in the Google search bar will automatically 
result in a warning stating that «some results may have been removed under data pro-
tection law in Europe»). The Court may want to keep an open eye and perhaps change 
its decision in a near future. 
